important implementing regulation of the Water Law. 5 As one author puts it:
… a small handful of non-state actors and activist organizations are not pluralistic by definition… Discussions have not helped expand discourses toward a reconciliatory realm of promoting a plural public policy debate (Regmi 2010) .
We examine further these polarised debates through an assessment of the experience of two cities -Jakarta and Bogor. The single paragraph in the Water Law that is supposed to regulate PSP does not provide clarity as to the extent and format of PSP allowed by the Water Law. Paragraph 4 states 'Cooperatives, privately-owned business enterprises and [members of the] society may participate in the undertaking of the development of [the] drinking water provision system' (author's italics). In order to obtain coherent interpretation, one needs to pay attention to the preceding paragraph (paragraph 3) which states: 'State Owned Enterprises and Regionally Owned Enterprises are the undertakers 8 of [the] drinking water provision system' (author's italics). The phrase 'merupakan penyelenggara' in paragraph 4 of Article 40 has often been translated as '… will be the organizers of … and '… shall carry out the development of …'. However, since 'penyelenggara' is a noun, whereas 'merupakan' is a statement of being, the author regards that '… are the undertakers of …' is the most appropriate English translation.
The rationale in separating the provision regulating the private sector in paragraph 4 with provision on State Owned Enterprises in paragraph 3 must be that the drafters of the law intended their roles to be differentiated. The author concludes that the drafters must have intended for State Owned Enterprises to be the main actor in the provision of drinking water while not entirely forbidding PSP. If PSP is to be regulated in great detail, there is a higher risk of invalidation by the Constitutional Court, as shown on the Judicial Review of the Electricity Law. Hence, the drafters left the clause on PSP vague and subsumed it in the same clause regulating cooperatives and 'other' members of the community.
Paragraph 4 of Article 64 of GR-16 stipulates that any involvement of the cooperatives or privately owned business enterprise should be done through a proper procurement procedure, as stipulated under prevailing laws and regulations while the fifth paragraph stipulates that following such procurement, the cooperatives or privately owned business enterprise shall 'enter into agreement' with the government.
'Neglected' PSPs

A brief history of Jakarta's 'concession'
There is a vast literature addressing the problems of the Jakarta water concession (see Kooy 2008; Iwanami and Nickson 2008; Bakker 2006 Bakker , 2007 . In late 1991, a combination of the World Bank and Japanese aid provided a loan to PAM Jaya (Jakarta's Regional Waterworks Company) in order to repair and expand its infrastructure (Harsono 2005) . Soon after the loan was provided, the World Bank approached the Indonesian government to allow private sector participation in Jakarta's water system. In 1995, the coverage of PAM Jaya was only 45 per cent, 30 per cent of which received intermittent supply (Jensen 2005) . In 1996, unaccounted for water was more than 55 per cent. Due to these problems, more investment was needed in order to expand coverage (Lanti 2006) . The government thought that inviting private sector input would lower tariffs and bring investment to the city's ailing water infrastructure (Braadbaart 2007) . RWE Thames Water acted first (Harsono 2005) by forming an alliance with Sigit Harjojudanto, the son of the ruling President Soeharto (ibid.) in exchange for a 20 per cent ownership of the project company. This move was later followed by Suez Lyonnaise by forming an alliance with the Salim Group, who were also close to former President Soeharto.
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Without any public tender and to the disappointment of the World Bank (Braadbaart 2007) , Soeharto finally agreed to privatise Jakarta's water supply in 1995 and subsequently ordered the Ministry of Public Works at that time to divide Jakarta into two service regions bordering the Ciliwung River. One part was to be given to his son Harjojudanto and Thames and the other half was to be provided to the Salim group and Suez. The negotiation process would take two years.
According to Braadbaart, the contract was signed with the most important contractual risks borne by PAM Jaya: (1) currency risk; (2) gradual tariff increase and projected sales; and (3) bulk water supplies. One of the most fatal blows to the contractual design was linking the security of these risks to private sector performance. In the event that PAM Jaya failed to secure the risks, the private sector would not be obligated to materialise its commitments.
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Agreement on the original Jakarta 'concession' bypassed any official procurement rules (Harsono 2003) . Many have discussed that the contract contained flaws with unbalanced distribution of risks and built-in disincentives for both the private sectors and the PAM Jaya to extend the network to the poor (Bakker 2006 (Bakker , 2007 . What is rarely discussed is the legal framework surrounding the 'concession' contract.
As discussed in the previous section, both Water Law 7/2004 and the GR-16, although vague in terms of ownership and regulatory model, to a limited extent regulate service levels, 11 customer service, and good governance issues.
12 Both the regulator and the private sector denied, however, that Water Law and GR-16 were applicable to the Jakarta Cooperation Contract.
13 Indeed, the Water Law does not contain any provision obligating that licences issued prior to its enactment be adjusted accordingly. This has been criticised at the Water Law's Judicial Review. Without the new rules applicable to the concession contract, the Jakarta PSP is left with two regional by-laws regulating water services.
However, water service in Jakarta is regulated by an 18-year-old rule, Regional By-Law 11/1993 ('By-Law 11'). Enacted in 1993, four years before the 'concession' contract was entered in 1997, this has never been reformed or amended since and is still in force today. Most rules in water services would contain the rights and obligation of customers. Some of the rights guaranteed are the right to be connected, the right to enjoy a certain level of service (see Hendry 2008) , the right to customer service, the right to be compensated, the right to financial aid, the right to redress, including the right to 'good governance' processes such as the right to participation and transparency (Al 'Afghani 2009) of the regulatory process. None of these rights are guaranteed by By-Law 11 and some are even denied.
The only 'rights' provided by By-Law 11 are the 'right' to ask for examination of a water meter, 14 to complain against inaccurate water metering (although it will not suspend their obligation to pay their monthly water tariffs) 15 and the right to make an 'objection' to the governor over penalties for water theft levied by PAM Jaya's director. Even this right to object is 'binding' 16 and no other recourse is provided by By-Law 11 although access to Court is in theory available.
The absence of customer rights, participation, transparency mechanisms and the power vested on PAM Jaya to arbitrarily disconnect customers for non-payment appears to challenge the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to which Indonesia is a party. 
Comparing Jakarta's regional by-laws (concession) with Bogor's regional by-law (publicly owned)
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the 'neglect' of PSP in the water sector, this section contrasts the regulatory framework in water services between Jakarta and Bogor. Bogor is a municipality 60km south of Jakarta with a population of 750,000 (compared to Jakarta's 10 million) and its water services are run by a publicly owned company.
Bogor's water services by-law was modified in 1996 and 2006. The 2006 amendment is particularly distinctive as it contains many guarantees on service levels and customer rights. The regional autonomy, which delegates the management of drinking water services to local government, might have been the driver for these reforms. This can be seen from a tendency in several other regions to conduct utilities reform after the autonomy was introduced in 2001. 18 The comparison between Jakarta's 1992/3 by-laws with Bogor's by-law, comes under five categories: duty to connect, service level/customer service, customer rights, redress mechanisms and tariff/bill components. These are discussed below. 19 In Jakarta's by-laws, there is a duty to serve a connection request from the industrial, residential or tourist sectors 20 imposed on the regional-owned waterworks company. However, there is no duty directly imposed on the private sector to connect customers. In Bogor, there is a general duty 'to serve' water services for its residents and a specific duty to extend the network to regions with groundwater of inadequate quality. 21 In terms of service levels, the Jakarta by-laws refer to the Ministerial Decree on drinking water quality;
22 but in practice, changes to the Decree are not automatically applicable. Due to the concession, changes to water quality regulation must be negotiated with the private sector. On the other hand, any changes to water quality regulation are directly applicable in Bogor. The Bogor regional by-law also contains provisions regulating service disruptions, the general obligation for the regional waterworks company to supply water of a certain quality, continuity and quantity (except in the event of force majeure) and a 24-hour customer service call centre and mailbox. 23 In terms of customer rights, the only 'right' available in the Jakarta regional by-law is the 'right' to object to PAM Jaya about an incorrect water meter, 24 the 'right' to object against imposition of penalties by the Governor and the 'right' to request an examination of the water meter. Even these are not directly formulated as rights. The word used is 'may', i.e. 'dapat mengajukan keberatan'('may' propose objection). On the other hand, the Bogor regional by-law contains provisions guaranteeing several rights, including to: (i) obtain results on the examination of water quality, accuracy of metering device, calculation of water bill; (ii) obtain an explanation on the agreed terms when submitting new connection requests; (iii) obtain information on the structure and amount of tariff; and (iv) receive a 50 per cent discount of the monthly fee if the water supply is disconnected on three consecutive days without prior notice. 25 
Conclusion
Drafters of the Water Law refrained from creating detailed provisions and chose to regulate PSP only vaguely. Out of 100 articles in the Water Law, only one paragraph is dedicated specifically to regulating PSP in water services. This move was criticised by one of the Judges' Dissenting Opinion as a 'disguised privatisation'.
At the local level where PSP occurs, such as in Jakarta, regulatory reforms have stopped at two 18-year-old regional by-laws, which have never been amended since enactment. Hence, the Jakarta 'concession' took place without sufficient back-up from a wider regulatory framework. In the present by-laws, there are no adequate guarantees on the utilities' duty to provide connections, service level/customer service, customer rights, redress mechanism or tariff/bills. In Bogor, by contrast, where water is publicly owned, these are effectively regulated.
The anti-privatisation debate has not been successful in democratising water services; instead, because of the government's reluctance to regulate PSP, this has resulted in water services being negotiated bilaterally through contractual means between government and the private sector, and away from public scrutiny.
For PSP to be better regulated in the future, Indonesia needs to move to a consensus at a national level. As a starting point, this requires anti-privatisation debates to become progressively depolarised. 
